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SIDE ONE: SETTING THE STAGE
“TAKE ME ON A TRIP”
Hey! Mr. Tambourine Man, play a song for me,
In the jingle-jangle morning I’ll come followin’ you.
1
Take me on a trip upon your magic swirling ship. . .
This story may not have a “magic swirling ship” or
references to mind altering substances, but the legal oddities
alone will do plenty to boggle the mind. When, in 1996, the
U.S. decided to take Japan to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) over perceived deficiencies in its sound recordings law,
the announcement was made in the straightforward, familiar
rhetoric of U.S.-Japan trade disputes. Thus, to uncover the
true motives and arguments requires sifting through the
political posturing and analyzing the history of the dispute in
light of the evolving law. There might even be more subtext to
unpack in this story than in the Bob Dylan song.
At the time the dispute arose, Japan’s laws only protected
foreign sound recordings first made in 1971 or later. Earlier
recordings were being freely copied and distributed on cheap
compilation CDs. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
estimated that millions of pre-1971 recordings were sold in
Japan annually and that Japan’s lack of intellectual property
protection for these recordings resulted in losses of as much as
2
$500 million per year to rights holders in the U.S. Although
3
this number was probably somewhat inflated, the potential
1. Bob Dylan, Mr. Tambourine Man, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME
(Columbia Records 1965). Lyrics available at
http://www.bobdylan.com/songs/tambourine.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
2. See Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative,
USTR Kantor Initiates WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings Against Japan
for its Sound Recording Copyright Practices (Feb. 9, 1996), at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1996/02/96-15.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2002)
[hereinafter, USTR, Kantor Initiates Dispute].
3. See Japan extends copyright protection 50 years, MUSIC & COPYRIGHT,
Jan. 29, 1997 (citing Recording Industry Association of Japan (RIAJ) estimate
of 6 million pre-1971 compilation recordings sold in 1995, and an International
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) estimate of 12 million
recordings, resulting loss of 240 million British pounds to rights holders, and
explaining that the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) arrived
at its figure by adding in potential loss of licensed albums containing songs
that were frequently placed in compilations); see also Bill Holland, Japan
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revenue to U.S. interests was certainly significant.
The
affected recordings included an entire era of artists who
achieved worldwide fame, including, along with Bob Dylan,
most of Elvis Presley’s recordings, some of the jazz of Duke
Ellington, the rock ‘n’ roll of Chuck Berry and Little Richard,
and Motown greats like Smokey Robinson. Other affected
recordings included Johnny Cash, Patsy Cline, the Beach Boys
4
and the Doors.
On January 1, 1996, Washington finally felt it had the ace
it needed to persuade Tokyo to change its law. That was the
date that the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) came into effect, backed
5
During the
by the enforcement provisions of the WTO.
Uruguay Round negotiations that culminated in the creation of
the WTO, the Recording Industry Association of America
(RIAA) had lobbied hard to get 50-year sound recordings
protection included in the TRIPS agreement—now, it saw
Japan as the perfect test case to find out if the treaty
6
commitments were worth the paper they were written on.
Thus, it prodded USTR to take action by filing the first-ever
7
dispute under TRIPS with the WTO on February 14, 1996.
The European Commission, representing the interest in
protection of recordings ranging from the Beatles to the Berlin
8
9
Philharmonic, joined in the dispute shortly thereafter. The
Extends C’Right Protection to 50 Years, New Law in Line with Global
Standards for Catalog, BILLBOARD, Dec. 28, 1996 (noting the Japanese
government believed the actual loss was closer to $100 million).
4. See USTR, Kantor Initiates Dispute, supra note 2; Mickey Kantor,
U.S. Trade Representative, Jay Berman, CEO, Recording Industry Association
of America, Ray Manzerak, Former Keyboardist, the Doors, Press Conference,
FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (Federal Information Systems Corporation) (Feb. 9,
1996) [hereinafter USTR Press Conference].
5. See World Trade Organization, Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2002).
6. Telephone Interview with Neil Turkewitz, Executive Vice President,
International Division, Recording Industry Association of America (Mar. 21,
2002) [hereinafter Turkewitz Interview].
7. World Trade Organization, Japan—Measures Concerning Sound
Recordings, Request for Consultations by the United States, WTO Doc.
WT/DS28/1 (Feb. 14, 1996).
8. See Fighting Japanese Law, ONE TO ONE, Apr. 1, 1996, available at
1996 WL 9244113.
9. See World Trade Organization, Japan—Measures Concerning Sound
Recordings, Request for Consultations from the European Communities, WTO
Doc. WT/DS42/1 (Feb. 28, 1996).
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specific provision at issue was the interpretation of the rule of
retroactivity in Article 18 of the Berne Convention for the
10
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works as applied to sound
recordings through Article 14.6 of TRIPS. The U.S. argued the
rule was basically a rigid one, requiring all countries to provide
full 50-year protection retroactively, while Japan argued
countries were permitted discretion in interpreting their
11
obligations.
The above description oversimplifies the tale; the parties
were not always clearly adverse, nor was the treaty
unambiguous. Thus, it is best to analyze this dispute as but
one movement in a concert of efforts by the RIAA to move
towards harmonizing sound recordings laws worldwide. The
result, however, may have been only more dissonance—now,
both the U.S. and Japan provide more protection for foreign
recordings than they do their own.
What follows is an “album” of short pieces—each slices the
dispute from a different angle while contributing to the story as
a whole. The tracks on “side one” provide the backdrop to the
dispute: an explanation of the Japanese domestic market for
sound recordings and the evolution of Japanese copyright laws,
intermixed with a few notes on the evolution of Federal
protection of sound recordings in the U.S. The second “side”
covers the crescendo of the dispute, and recites a few verses on
the legal arguments that were made (or could have been made),
including an interlude on the theoretical role of U.S. state law
protection in interpreting the legal dispute. Finally, this
experiment comes to an end with a coda on the political
undertones that resulted in Japan’s eventual capitulation and
the bizarre state of sound recordings law today. Like any
“music,” this album revolves around the repetition and
variation of a theme: when political concerns drive efforts for
legal change, we should not be surprised to find the resulting
law rife with anomalies.

10. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
Paris Act, July 24, 1971, (as amended on September 28, 1979), art. 18, 102
Stat. 2853, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/index.html [hereinafter Berne Convention].
11. See the discussion in the section entitled, “Yesterday Came Suddenly,”
infra p.200.
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“ROCK ‘N’ ROLL MUSIC, ANY OLD WAY YOU CHOOSE IT”—THE
JAPANESE DOMESTIC MARKET
Japan has always been a country of contradictions. Pop
out of the train station in the Shinjuku or Shibuya districts of
Tokyo and one can’t miss the proliferation of Japanese CD
shops existing side-by-side with a few large foreign record
chains such as HMV and Tower. The first-time visitor to these
shops might notice an apparent anomaly in pricing. Japaneseartist CDs and foreign-artist CDs pressed in Japan cost around
12
¥3500 (about $32 at early 1996 exchange rates) and the price
is pre-printed on the back CD cover next to the bar code.
Meanwhile, the typical imported CD sold at HMV sells for
¥2500 ($23) or less. In short, imports are much cheaper than
domestic products—even for identical music (in the case of
foreign artist music pressed onto CDs in Japan). Finally, down
in the subway malls and on the street corners, one will
encounter countless small CD stands selling various
compilations of older music for about ¥980 ($9).
This tripartite pricing is a result not of market forces, but
rather of two peculiarities of Japanese sound recordings law.
The first pricing gap—the spread of about ¥1000 between
Japanese-pressed CDs and imports—has little to do with
copyright laws, although it is sometimes misunderstood as
such. Rather, it is the result of the interaction of Japan’s fixed
price system with the reality of parallel imports of sound
13
recordings. Prices of CDs, like many other products, are set
14
by the government in coordination with industry groups.
Foreign companies are permitted to import CDs pressed
overseas while masters of the same music may also be imported
15
for CDs pressed in Japan. Because the price of Japan-pressed
CDs is fixed higher than abroad, the result is that imports are
often cheaper. Thus, consumers comfortable with the foreign
version of a CD (without Japanese translation of song titles)
12. The prices in this paragraph were those prevailing in 1996. On my
most recent trip to Japan in August 2002, I noticed the price of domestic CDs
had come down to about ¥3000, and the price of imported CDs had come down
to just under ¥2000. See Phil Hardy, Japanese record companies fight parallel
imports as CD market continues to decline, MUSIC & COPYRIGHT, May 8, 2002.
13. See, e.g., id. Parallel imports of CDs have once again become the
subject of controversy. Id.
14. See, e.g., Record, Tape, CD Resale Price Control to Be Relaxed, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE (Kyodo News Service), Oct. 28, 1992.
15. See Steve McClure, HMV, Tower Expand Presence in Tokyo, Outlets to
Open in City’s Busiest Shopping Districts, BILLBOARD, Nov. 16, 1996, at 10.

188

MINNESOTA INTEL. PROPERTY REVIEW [Vol. 4:183
16

can save a bundle.
By contrast, the small shops selling the ¥980 compilations
generally can afford to do so by selling public domain
recordings. Small companies had routinely sold compilations
including recordings of everything from Elvis to the Beach
Boys—recordings that used to be in the Japanese public
domain but are now the subject of this dispute. But one should
not be under the impression that whole albums were being
ripped off. In fact, the Recording Industry Association of Japan
(RIAJ) paid to license full single-artist albums sold through
17
more traditional Japanese music shops. It was mainly this
particularly narrow—but cheap and popular—category of
18
compilation CDs that raised the ire of the RIAA.
As a result of Japan’s 1997 extension of retroactive
protection to these older recordings, consumers now have no
choice but to buy licensed versions.
This was a great
opportunity for foreign retail music chains to profitably fill the
void left by the death of the compilations. Indeed, at the same
time as the WTO dispute, HMV and Tower Records were
19
Interviews with store
aggressively expanding in Japan.
managers revealed that one impetus for this expansion
strategy was the anticipated extension of retroactive protection
20
As for the U.S. and E.U. recording
to older recordings.
industries, whether a Japanese consumer bought the Japanese
version or the U.S. version was irrelevant — more money was
flowing back to artists at home.
“I HEARD IT THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE”—EVOLUTION OF
JAPANESE DOMESTIC LAW
Japan’s sound recordings laws underwent numerous twists
21
and turns. Legal protection of domestic musical works dates
22
back to 1899 when the first chosakuken (authorship right) law
16. “Bonus tracks” are common on Japanese versions of Western artists’
recordings to give Japanese collectors an additional reason to buy the more
expensive version.
17. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 3.
18. See Turkewitz Interview, supra note 6.
19. See McClure, supra note 15, at 10.
20. Id. A new law on record rental rights was also implemented and
encouraged foreign record chains that the market for sales would expand. Id.
21. Teruo Doi, Japan, in 2 INT’L COPYRIGHT L. AND PRAC. Jap-§ 1[1]
(Paul Edward Geller, ed., 2001).
22. Id. RentarÀ Mizuno, councilor of the Ministry of Interior, “introduced
the word chosakuken, which literally means “authorship right,” when he
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was promulgated and included literary, scientific, or artistic
23
works. Protection for sound recordings was added in a 1930
24
amendment prohibiting unauthorized reproduction. In 1934,
a major amendment expanded copyright law by giving record
producers the exclusive right to make and perform a recording
25
(by playing back the recording) just as if they were the
26
authors.
These “authors” rights have been described as
27
“neighboring rights.” The term of protection was the life of
28
this “author” plus 30 years.
This blurred line between
original author copyrights and neighboring rights was cleared
up in 1971 when, as one of many provisions in an omnibus 1970
Copyright Act, performers, producers of sound recordings, and
broadcast organizations were given neighboring rights
29
protection, including the right to authorize reproductions. At
the same time, the term of protection was shortened to 20
30
years while original authors retained the 30-year term of
31
protection. The neighboring rights protection term was then
32
re-extended to 30 years in 1988, and then finally, in 1992, the
33
term was extended to 50 years, but the extension applied only
34
to works still protected at that time. Thus pre-1962 Japanese
35
recordings remained in the public domain.
Foreign sound recordings were not protected at all until
drafted the 1899 Copyright Act (Chosakuken HÀ). Id.
23. Doi, supra note 21, at Jap-§ 1[1].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See id. at Jap-§ 3[2][c] (“In Japan, neighboring rights protect
performances, sound recordings, and broadcasts and cablecasts.”).
28. Id. at Jap-§ 9[1][a][[i].
29. Christopher Heath, All Her Trouble Seemed so Far Away: EU v Japan
before the WTO, 18 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 677, 678 (Dec. 1996), available in
a slightly different version at
http://www.capi.uvic.ca/jplawconf/chrisrepwk.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
30. See id.; Doi, supra note 21, at Jap-§ 9[1].
31. See Doi, supra note 21, at Jap-§ 9[1] (noting that the new neighboring
rights holder status superseded the previous copyright protection for sound
recordings).
32. Id. at Jap-§ 9[1][a][i].
33. Id.
34. See Heath, supra note 29, at 678 (observing that “[o]nly the latest
revision of copyright law, in force since 1 January 1996, has [introduced
retroactive protection]”).
35. Lionel S. Sobel, Retroactive Copyright Protection for Recordings,
Japanese Style: An American Diplomatic Triumph . . . Complete with
Anomalies and Ironies, 18 ENT. L. REP. 4, 6 (Feb. 1997).
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October 14, 1978 when Japan signed and ratified the Geneva
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms
36
Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms. In
1989, Japan joined the International Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and
37
Broadcasting Organisations (1961 Rome Convention).
However, Japan’s implementing legislation in both cases
38
explicitly excluded retroactive application and thus the vast
39
majority of foreign recordings were not protected. In contrast,
the composer-author’s copyright continued to be protected by
Japan’s ratification of (1) the Universal Copyright Convention
of 1952 (Japan ratification in 1956), and (2) the Paris Act of
40
1971 of the Berne Convention (Japan ratification in 1975).
In 1995, anticipating the TRIPS Agreement, Japan
repealed all provisions denying retroactive protection and
granted neighboring-rights protection for recordings of sounds
first fixed after the January 1, 1971 implementation of the new
41
As a result, while composer-authors of preCopyright Act.
1971 recordings were being paid via a collecting society,
performers and producers were uncompensated for
42
reproductions of their recordings fixed before 1971. Although
not made explicit, the justification for choosing the 1971 date
seems to have been a sense that Japan should not have to
43
provide more protection for foreign works than domestic ones.
36. Heath, supra note 29, at 678.
37. Doi, supra note 21, at Jap-§ 1[2].
38. See id. at Jap-§ 9[1][a][ii] at n.6 (explaining that the 1994 and 1996
revisions to the 1970 Copyright Act repealed Japan’s prior non-retroactivity
provisions); see generally, Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers
of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct.
29, 1971, art. 7(3), 25 U.S.T. 309, 328 (providing that states are not bound to
apply the treaty retroactively); accord Rome International Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organisations, Oct. 26, 1961, art. 20(1), 496 U.N.T.S. 43. Both treaty texts are
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/index.html.
39. Cf. Heath, supra note 29, at 678.
40. See Doi, supra note 21, at Jap-§ 1[2].
41. Mihály Ficsor, The TRIPS Agreement and the Application of the
Dispute Settlement Mechanism for IP Cases: Seen by an Outsider from Inside,
Outline of Contribution to AIPPI Congress in Melbourne 3 (Mar. 25-30, 2001)
(document as provided by Mr. Ficsor on file with author) [hereinafter Ficsor
Contribution]. See also Heath, supra note 29, at 678.
42. Heath, supra note 29, at 678.
43. Jon Choy, Washington Blows WTO Whistle on Japanese Music
Copyrights, JEI REPORT (Japan Econ. Inst. of Am.), Feb 23, 1996, available at
1996 WL 8315881. However, the 1971 date appears to be rather arbitrary,
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An argument that it chose this date because it was near to the
start date of U.S. Federal protection for those sound recordings
is plausible, but not compelling, because it arbitrarily chose a
date that was a year earlier than the start of that protection.
Japan felt it had a legally defensible position. Although
Article 18 of the Berne Convention, as applied through Article
14.6 of the TRIPS Agreement, requires countries to provide
retroactive protection, it does not require countries to provide
longer protection than the same recording would receive in its
44
country of origin. Japan believed that Article 18(3) allowed
considerable discretion in choosing how to apply this “rule of
45
the shorter term” in its own implementing legislation.
Furthermore, Japanese officials insisted that during the TRIPS
negotiations they had received various assurances from the
U.S., the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
and other signatories that retroactive protection to 1971 would
46
be sufficient to meet its treaty obligations. Japan’s reliance
argument was somewhat supported by practice under the
47
Berne Convention, as we will see in a later section.
“BACK IN THE USA”—RESTORATION AND THE URAA
By comparison, the history of U.S. treatment of domestic
sound recordings looks deceptively tame. Many states have
criminal penalties for record piracy and protect against
unauthorized reproduction on a misappropriation or conversion
48
Federal protection of sound recordings began on
theory.
February 15, 1972 with the implementation of the Sound
Recordings Act of 1971. When the 1976 Copyright Act was
drafted, a Congressional misunderstanding of a Supreme Court
49
precedent apparently led to a specific exception of pre-1972
because domestic recordings were protected back to 1962. See Sobel, supra
note 35, at 6.
44. Berne Convention, supra note 10, at 11.
45. See the discussion in the section entitled, “Yesterday Came Suddenly,”
infra p.200.
46. E.g., Bhushan Bahree, U.S., European Union Turn to WTO to Make
Japan Extend Music Protection, WALL ST. J., Feb 12, 1996, at A10; Choy,
supra note 43; Michiyo Nakamoto, US Threatens Japan over Music Rights,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1996, at 3.
47. See the discussion in the section entitled, “Yesterday Came Suddenly,”
infra p.200.
48. 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §
8C.03 (2001) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
49. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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sound recordings from the Section 301 provisions that pre50
empted state copyright laws. Such exception will last until
51
February 15, 2067, when preemption will take effect. Thus,
sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972 receive federal
52
statutory protection while those fixed before that date are left
to the protection of state law.
Federal protection of foreign sound recordings was recent
and sudden. The TRIPS implementation legislation—a portion
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA)—restored
protection to a large category of foreign works. The relevant
provisions appeared as amendments to section 104A of the
53
Copyright Act. The U.S. decided to interpret Berne Article 18
retroactivity requirements favorably with the hope that giving
sweeping protection to foreign works in the U.S. would
54
Section
encourage other countries to return the favor.
104A(h)(6)(C)(ii) of the Copyright Act explicitly restored federal
protection to foreign sound recordings that were in the public
55
Meanwhile Section
domain due to Section 301 preemption.
104A(h)(6)(B) limited that restoration to works whose
56
protection had not yet expired in its source country.
The result? Under the new provisions, the U.S. had
extended copyright protection to all post-1962 Japanese
recordings, that is, all Japanese sound recordings that were not
in the public domain as of the coming into force of the TRIPS
57
This is true despite the fact that federal
agreement.
protection of domestic sound recordings only begins with
58
recordings first fixed after February 15, 1972, while the
50. See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 48, § 2.10[B][1][a].
51. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2000).
52. Duration of such protection is the same as other federal copyrights
and is governed by 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2000).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000).
54. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 48, at 9A-76. See also, infra
note 108 and accompanying text.
55. 17 U.S.C. 104A(h)(6)(C)(ii) explicitly includes in the definition of a
“restored work” those in the public domain due to the “lack of subject matter
protection in the case of sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972.”
56. 17 U.S.C. §§ 104A(h)(6)(C)(ii), (h)(6)(B). See also Sobel, supra note 35,
at 5-6.
57. See the section entitled, “I Heard It Through the Grapevine,” supra
p.188.
58. 17 U.S.C. 104A(h)(8)(A) denies retroactivity to domestic works by
defining the source country of a “restored work” as “a nation other than the
United States.” Thus, Section 301 preemption still applies to domestic sound
recordings fixed before Feb. 15, 1972.
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neighboring rights law in Japan protected U.S. sound
59
recordings only back to 1971.
Analyzing the plain language of the Berne Convention
retroactivity provisions in the most favorable way, the RIAA
60
determined that Japan was required to provide retroactive
protection to all U.S. sound recordings that met the criteria of
Article 18(1)—that is, recordings that had not entered into the
public domain in the U.S. through the “expiry of the term of
61
protection.” Apparently arguing that pre-1972 U.S. works had
not “expired” because they never received any protection at
62
all, RIAA and USTR counted back the TRIPS-mandated
minimum 50-year term from January 1, 1996, the date TRIPS
compliance became mandatory for developed country WTO
63
RIAA and USTR argued that, as of the start of
members.
1996, Japan was in violation of its TRIPS obligations for not
protecting U.S. sound recordings back to January 1, 1946—
sixteen years earlier than the date at which the U.S. was
64
This broad
required by TRIPS to protect Japanese works.
reading of the rule of retroactivity advocated by the U.S. had
even broader consequences for Japan than it did at home.
65
The few analyses of the case that exist in the literature
only hint at the actual arguments on the U.S. and Japanese
sides. Although some of these allude to the political subtext
that ultimately drove the Japanese to change their law, none
analyze whether the continuing protection of sound recordings
through state law in the U.S. should have affected the legal
66
The research revealed below suggests some
arguments.
answers, but also suggests more oddities in the international
law of sound recordings protection. Ultimately, the only sure
thing illustrated by the dispute is that when political means
are used to reach legal ends, it should not be surprising that
the results are full of anomalies.
59. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
60. Turkewitz Interview, supra note 6.
61. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 18(1).
62. Later sections will analyze whether this was an accurate basis for
argument. See the section entitled “Too Much Monkey Business,” infra p.204.
63. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, art. 65, para. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
64. Sobel, supra note 35, at 5, 6.
65. Choy, supra note 43; Sobel, supra note 35; Heath, supra note 29.
66. Choy, supra note 43; Sobel, supra note 35; Heath, supra note 29.
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SIDE TWO: THE SHOW MUST GO ON
It might come as a surprise that the Japanese government
was probably already planning to change its law before the U.S.
67
filed its complaint with the WTO.
In fact there was even
speculation that major constituencies in Japan wanted the law
68
amended. Knowing that the result was almost assured, the
actions taken by the U.S. and the RIAA must be placed in that
context in order to be properly understood. In many ways the
whole case was but a show with four intended audiences:
Americans skeptical about the benefits of WTO membership, a
Japanese bureaucracy known for dragging its feet, Japanese
consumers who would have to pay higher prices for oldies, and
the governments of developing countries, which were
understandably nervous about the power of the new TRIPS
agreement.
“LIGHT MY FIRE”—THE HISTORY OF SHAME DIPLOMACY
69

Despite other possible options, the RIAA’s best strategy
was to work with USTR to resolve the dispute in the WTO
context.
A WTO panel ruling would resolve the issue
70
worldwide and set an example for other WTO members.
When the TRIPS Agreement became effective in 1996, USTR
was poised to light a fire under the traditionally slow-moving
officials at the Japanese Ministry of Trade and Industry
(MITI). On September 8, 1995, U.S. administration officials
announced that, because crucial negotiations in other areas
had wrapped up, USTR would return its attention to the sound
71
recordings dispute currently on the back burner.
Japan had been the target of RIAA lobbying efforts for
72
decades.
The U.S. position (that Japan’s protection was
73
inadequate) provided a major impetus for TRIPS. Indeed, at

67. Bill Holland & Steve McClure, U.S., EU charge Japan with not
amending c’right laws, BILLBOARD, Feb. 24, 1996.
68. Choy, supra note 43.
69. For example, the RIAA never explored a suit by the record companies
in Japan, even though it seems that it probably could have done so because
the TRIPS agreement may have been self-executing in Japan. Turkewitz
Interview, supra note 6.
70. Turkewitz Interview, supra note 6.
71. U.S. to Pressure Japan on Sound-Recording Copyrights, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE (Kyodo News Service), Sept. 9, 1995.
72. Turkewitz Interview, supra note 6.
73. Id.
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various times during the TRIPS agreement negotiations, the
U.S. raised specific issues regarding Japan’s sound recordings
protection laws, short protection period and permissive record
74
rentals laws. The U.S. wanted to effectively reform Japanese
law through TRIPS and provide a model for reform in other
75
countries. In contrast, the Berne Convention had been
notoriously ineffective, illustrated by the remarkable fact that,
76
despite an apparent treaty right, no cases had ever been
77
brought to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
The Berne Convention’s ineffectiveness was further illustrated
by U.S. actions after its accession in 1989: USTR did not
abandon its preferred method of motivating countries to
78
improve IP protection through the “Special 301” watch lists.
These “Special 301” countries have intellectual property
policies and practices which USTR finds inadequate and are
79
In fact, in February
subject to unilateral trade sanctions.
74. Id.
75. The RIAA discussions with Japan occurred independently of the
USTR’s negotiations and continued throughout the TRIPS negotiation.
Turkewitz Interview, supra note 6.
76. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 33(1). Countries acceding to
Berne were permitted, upon ratification, to take a reservation on the
International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction. Id. at art. 33(2). Surprisingly,
the U.S. did not take this reservation. The list of contracting parties,
including a designation of which countries took this reservation, is available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/berne/index.html.
77. Cf. Bahree, supra note 46, at A10. Bahree notes that “until recently
[international copyright protection] was the subject of international
treaties . . . written more than a century ago” and that “trade officials . . .
expect much stricter enforcement . . . now that disputes can be taken to the
WTO.” Id. Furthermore, Bahree notes that Japanese officials said that the
Berne Convention “allows [Japan] leeway because of its ambiguity on key
issues.” Id.
78. See generally USTR Ann. Special 301 Rep. available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/intellectual.shtml (follow “Our Top Priorities
(Annual Special 301 Announcement)” to a specific year’s report).
79. USTR is required, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (as
amended) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000)), to create a watch list of foreign
countries that “deny adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights, or . . . deny fair and equitable market access to United States persons
that rely upon intellectual property protection.” 19 U.S.C. § 2242(a) (2000).
Countries with the “most onerous or egregious” practices and that are not
negotiating with the U.S. in good faith to improve the situation are placed on a
priority watch list. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b) (2000). Countries on this list will be
investigated by USTR, it is required to impose sanctions if the “act, policy, or
practice” is “unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce.”
19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1); see generally USTR Ann. Special 301 Rep. available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/intellectual.shtml (follow “Our Top Priorities
(Annual Special 301 Announcement)” to reports explaining USTR’s mandate
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1996, USTR announced that Japan would remain on the
priority watch list despite improvements to its intellectual
property laws (recently enacted under Japan’s TRIPS-enabling
80
legislation). Although Section 301 implicated only unilateral
81
means (of questionable legality ) to spur listed countries to
82
reform, many observers believe it has been effective. Perhaps
the most powerful aspect of putting Japan on the “Special 301”
watch list was that this allowed USTR to brand Japan as
backward-looking in its intellectual property policy—a
continuing negative image would have hurt Japan’s efforts to
be a role model for developing countries that were grappling
83
with implementing new intellectual property laws. Implicit in
this “shame” approach to trade politics is the view that all
forward-looking countries should want strong intellectual
property protection.
Until TRIPS, shame was the only effective weapon in the
U.S. arsenal against Japan. Despite Japan’s placement on the
“Special 301” watch list and USTR consultations with Japanese
officials on at least thirteen occasions in 1995 and 1996, the
and policy regarding intellectual property matters); Judith H. Bello & Alan F.
Holmer, U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 21: GATT Dispute Settlement
Agreement: Internationalization or Elimination of Section 301?, 26 INT’L LAW.
795, 798-99 (1992) (explaining that Section 301 was a Congressional response
to inadequate GATT policies and a method to enforce U.S. interests and
reforms not required under GATT).
80. Kantor Slaps Japan with WTO Case on Music Copyrights, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE (Kyodo News Service), Feb. 9, 1996 [hereinafter Kantor
Slaps Japan].
81. Unilateral trade sanctions without approval from an adopted WTO
panel report are a violation of WTO rules. See, e.g., C. O’Neal Taylor, The
Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organization
Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 293-94 (1997).
U.S. Section 301 sanctions, therefore, are probably inconsistent with U.S.
WTO obligations. See id.
82. See, e.g., GREG MASEL & RACHEL HINES, SECTION 301: A CATALYST
FOR FREE TRADE (Economic Strategy Inst. 1995). But see generally Taylor,
supra note 81 (arguing that Section 301 unilateralism has limited
effectiveness); Myles Getlan, Comment, TRIPs and the Future of Section 301:
A Comparative Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 173 (1995) (arguing that Section 301 failed to provide an effective means of
protecting U.S. intellectual property rights abroad and concluding that the
GATT’s dispute resolution process is more appropriate and effective).
83. See Heath, supra note 29, at 679 (discussing Japan’s position on
retroactivity and noting that Japan would not like to be “hailed as the
champion in how to cleverly flout international obligations”); Choy, supra note
43 (noting that Japan’s defense of limiting copyright protection could undercut
its own efforts “to encourage developing countries to implement strong
intellectual property laws”).
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Japanese government made no discernible movement towards a
84
resolution of the sound recordings protection dispute.
But
after January 1, 1996, WTO dispute settlement procedures
were added to USTR’s arsenal. USTR could now threaten
Japan with a binding panel decision and legal retaliatory
85
Even though USTR brandished the new WTO
sanctions.
dispute settlement threat effectively, the U.S. continued
employing the “shame” tactic.
“A WHOLE LOT OF SHAKING GOING ON”—USING SHAME TO
RATTLE JAPAN
On February 5, 1996, barely a month after the TRIPS
provisions became enforceable, and days before the U.S. even
announced its intent to file a dispute with the WTO, the
86
Nikkei revealed that the government was already preparing to
87
change its law. The U.S. negotiators were probably aware of
this development but the stage was already set and the show
had to go on. The audience was, after all, not just the Japanese
government, but included the Japanese and the American
public as well.
The Japanese people would have to be
convinced to accept higher prices for music. As for the
American electorate, the Washington Post reported that the
Clinton administration hoped the sound recordings case would
be a compelling and accessible way to show that the WTO could
be used to the U.S.’s advantage, thereby deflecting criticism
that submission to the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures
88
would offend U.S. sovereignty.
84. See USTR Press Conference, supra note 4.
85. Provisions of the TRIPS agreement are enforced by the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding. TRIPS, supra note 63, art. 64(1).
86. The Nikkei is Japan’s leading business newspaper.
See,
http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/FR/SERV/help/hlpninfo.html.
87. Holland & McClure, supra note 67. The Nikkei article, according to
Holland & McClure, stated that:
[T]he Japanese government has informally decided to extend the
protection period in what insiders call “a trial balloon” floated by the
Cultural Affairs Agency to gauge public reaction. . . . [The Nikkei]
quoted unnamed government sources as saying that Japan would roll
back its neighboring rights protection period to 50 years. The source
reportedly said that although the existing 25-year period does not
violate WTO regulations, it is “desirable” to integrate Japan’s
protection-period standards with those of the U.S. and Europe. There
was no mention of when such a change would take place.
Id.
88. Paul Blustein, U.S. Says Japan Violates Copyright Rules: Jazz, Rockand-Roll Oldies Not Being Protected, Kantor Tells WTO, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
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On February 9, 1996, against the backdrop of these
political considerations, Mickey Kantor, U.S. Trade
Representative, held a press conference to announce that the
89
U.S. was officially filing a dispute with the WTO. Appearing
at that press conference were Jay Berman, CEO of RIAA, and
90
several other recording industry executives. Furthermore, to
heighten the emotional appeal, USTR specifically requested
that the RIAA bring an artist affected by the lack of Japanese
91
As a result, former Doors keyboardist, Ray
protection.
Manzerak, was invited and asked to speak on behalf of
92
similarly affected artists.
MR. BERMAN: . . .
Would you like to say something on your own behalf?
MR. MANZERAK:
(Laughs.) Thanks, Jay.
Good morning. I’m going to just say a few words about the rights of
the artist.
We all know about the economic situation, but from the artist’s
perspective, what the Japanese are doing and—it’s my favorite
country, you know. . . . I love Japan; my wife is . . . American
Japanese, and we have a 22-year-old son. Nothing that I have done
as an artist in Japan comes back to them.
I’m still alive. Don’t I deserve to receive what is my just deserts after
these recordings have been made? We made these recordings in ‘67, 8, -9. . . . I received no royalties from any of these bootlegs. Quite
simply, that’s what we call them. These are bootlegs. These are
bootlegs. These are pirate versions of the real thing. And this is a
criminal act.
This is, more importantly for the Japanese, a shameful act. Not to
respect the rights of the artist before 1971 is a shameful thing for the
Japanese to do because they’re the most intellectual people I’ve ever
met, extremely artistic. They love art. And not to respect the right of
the artist, of the performer, in their—one of their favorite areas,
American music—Elvis Presley, Little Richard, Fats Domino, Chuck
Berry—into the ‘60s—the Beach Boys, the Doors, Jimi Hendrix,
Simon and Garfunkel, all of Motown. Let’s just take all of Motown
and make compilations of Diana Ross and the Temptations and Stevie
Wonder, et cetera, et cetera. All of—and jazz! My God, the Japanese
love jazz. How about compilation albums of John Coltrane, Miles

1996, at D2.
89. USTR Press Conference, supra note 4.
90. Id.
91. Telephone Interview with Joe Papovich, Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative for Intellectual Property (Apr. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Papovich
Interview].
92. Id.
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Davis, Thelonious Monk? You can’t do this. Those are artists, those
are creators.
They’re the same as literary artists who retain the rights to their
works for 50 years after their death, continues to go—the rights
continue to belong to the estate. That’s what should happen in the
case of my son, my wife. If I’m gone, those rights should—to my
recordings should retain, should stay in my domain. Fifty years after
my death if it goes public domain, well, that’s a different story. But
what the Japanese are doing now is shameful in regards to the
artists, and I can only say to them, my friends, please join the World
Trade Organization, 1946, honor the treaty, honor the TRIPS
93
agreement. 1946 on, the rights belong to the artist.

If Manzerak’s statement shows anything, it is that the
emotional and moral appeal to the Japanese was apparently
much more important to the U.S. case than was presenting a
94
These statements were directed
consistent legal argument.
95
toward the Japanese reporters specifically to help bolster
Japanese domestic support for changing the law.
The moral tone of Manzerak’s speech highlights an
additional oddity of the whole debate. USTR and RIAA’s
attempts to appeal to the Japanese public’s sense that it is
morally wrong to make unauthorized copies of recordings
sounds like an endorsement of a moral justification for
copyright protection. Nonetheless, U.S. legal circles have been
adamant in not recognizing “moral rights” in the legal sense
because that would require extension of, inter alia, a right to
object to mutilation of a work, under Article 6bis of the Berne
96
Although “moral rights” is a term of art now
Convention.
somewhat divorced from a moral theory for protection, the
dialectical inconsistency here only further proves the point:
that political means to achieve legal ends often result in
anomalous results.
The press conference did at least give a nod to the legal
arguments. In the questioning from reporters, Berman frankly
acknowledged the discrepancies in amount of protection for

93. USTR Press Conference, supra note 4.
94. I leave it to the reader to note the legal oversimplifications in
Manzerak’s statement. My purpose is to show that the diplomatic effort was
clearly emotional and political rather than legal, and not to point out
Manzerak’s errors.
95. Papovich Interview, supra note 91.
96. See, generally, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 48, §§ 8D.01,
8D.02 (noting the consistent failure of U.S. courts to find for plaintiffs in moral
rights cases).
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foreign and domestic recordings in both countries.
he countered

97

However,

[t]hey’re obligated to do so by TRIPS, as we were obligated to give the
Japanese better protection retroactively than we give to our own
artists. This is what you undertook when you signed the
agreement. . . . This was one of the victories, and now it turns out to
98
be—it’s not there.

But Berman was not always so confident in the meaning of
the TRIPS obligations. In fact, the whole dispute was part of a
long-term and highly orchestrated effort to encourage countries
to interpret their TRIPS obligations as strictly as possible.
Given the apparent inevitability of reaching a successful
diplomatic conclusion with Japan, the negotiations partially
glossed over a number of potentially rocky legal points. To
address those, we have to backtrack once more.
“YESTERDAY CAME SUDDENLY”—THE ARGUMENTS FOR
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
Under the Berne Convention, many countries had the
practice of interpreting the retroactivity requirement quite
loosely. Some European countries did not provide retroactive
99
protection and many former Soviet republics had refused to
100
grant retroactive protection when they acceded.
Their
authority came from a broad reading of Berne Article 18(3),
which provides, “respective countries shall determine, each in
so far as it is concerned, the conditions of application of this
101
principle [the retroactivity provisions].” This appears to be a
signal that domestic law on the issue of retroactivity will
102
control. This provision is not as bizarre as it may seem. One
must realize that in countries where a treaty can be self103
executing, like Japan, an escape clause like the one in Article
97. USTR Press Conference, supra note 4.
98. Id.
99. Japan cited the Netherlands, Finland, and Denmark as countries that
did not provide 50-year retroactive protection for sound recordings. Peter
Chapman, EU to Address Japan’s Lacking Cright Reform, BILLBOARD, Jun.
29, 1996.
100. Ficsor Contribution, supra note 41, at 3.
101. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 18(3).
102. Heath, supra note 29, at 679.
103. The Japanese Constitution at Article 98(2) provides that ‘‘[t]he
treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully
observed.’’ For an English translation, see Doi, supra note 21, at Jap-§ 6[2].
Copyright-related treaties are explicitly self-executing in Japan under Article
5 of the 1970 Copyright Act, which is meant to clarify that if there is a conflict

2002]

RETROACTIVE PROTECTION

201

18(3) might have been a crucial bargaining point. Japanese
officials, taking a cue from the old practice of flexibility under
the Berne Convention, insisted that retroactivity under TRIPS
104
was also flexible. This argument was reasonable because the
TRIPS agreement, in Article 14(6), incorporates retroactivity
for sound recordings merely by providing that Berne Article 18
105
Therefore, they argued that
applies “mutatis mutandis.”
Japanese law need not provide greater retroactive protection
for foreign recordings than for domestic ones. Japan never
106
conceded the point even after changing their law.
Furthermore, at least one outside scholar appears to have
107
believed Japan’s legal analysis was right.
The RIAA was indeed concerned that Article 18(3) could be
interpreted too broadly. Although at the 1996 press conference
CEO Jay Berman asserted that the article mandated a narrow
interpretation, he displayed a marked lack of confidence before
Congress just two years earlier. In 1994, at the Congressional
hearings on the URAA, Berman warned:
If [Berne Article 18(3)] permits a great deal of latitude, including a
decision to not apply retroactivity at all, then the U.S. victory
embodied in [TRIPS] Article 14[(6)] will be hollow indeed. It will be
much like the myth of Sisyphus. We will have labored long and hard
only to see the ball come down again.
....
Unless we are successful now in introducing a narrow interpretation
of Article 18(3) of Berne, we run the risk of leaving unprotected all
U.S. sound recordings produced prior to [the year 2000, when TRIPS
108
becomes effective for developing country WTO members].
between Japanese law and its treaty obligations, the treaty should govern. Id.
104. Kantor Slaps Japan, supra note 80. See also U.S. Files Petition with
WTO Against Japan on Copyrights, JAPAN WEEKLY MONITOR (Kyodo News
Service Int’l), Feb. 12, 1996; Choy, supra note 43.
105. TRIPS, supra note 63, art. 14(6) (“[T]he provisions of Article 18 of the
Berne Convention (1971) shall also apply, mutatis mutandis, to the rights of
performers and producers of phonograms in phonograms.”).
106. Papovich Interview, supra note 91.
107. Heath, supra note 29, at 679 (“Japan seems to be correct in its
interpretation of the law. . . .”) (emphasis added). Interestingly, a slightly
different
and
more
recent
version
of
Heath’s
article,
at
http://www.capi.uvic.ca/jplawconf/chrisrepwk.htm (last visited Oct 12, 2002),
reads “Japan may be correct in its interpretation of the law” (emphasis added).
108. GATT Intellectual Property Provisions: Joint Hearing on H.R. 4894
and S. 2368 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks of the Senate Judiciary Comm. and House Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin. of the House Judiciary Comm., 103d
Cong. 258 (1994) (statement of Jason S. Berman, CEO, RIAA) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Berman Hearing Statement].
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Berman realized that the U.S. would have a stronger
bargaining position with the Japanese if its own position that
retroactivity was mandatory was implemented by changing
U.S. law to provide maximum retroactive protection to foreign
109
The RIAA helped its cause by citing the lack of
recordings.
110
any significant domestic opposition, and the provision was
enacted as a result of this lobbying effort. This practice of
arguing one thing to Congress and another thing to the
Japanese only further serves to highlight the primacy of
political concerns over legal consistency.
With the domestic element in place, the RIAA turned to
making its case to the Japanese. RIAA and USTR sought out
111
various expert opinions they hoped would bolster their cause.
USTR consulted with several copyright experts in the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office who, in turn, asked the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) for its opinion on
112
The move turned out
the correct interpretation of Article 18.
to be brilliant. Mihály Ficsor, then the Assistant Director
General of WIPO, researched the negotiating history of the
113
Berne Convention and wrote the response to the U.S. request.
Ficsor came to the conclusion that Article 18(3) was intended to
apply only to transitional measures relating to the protection of
the “legitimate interests of those who have relied on the
previous legal situation” in investing in the exploitation of
public domain works, and further, that such measures were
only intended to subsist for an “extreme maximum” of two
years, so as to be consistent with the transition period for
musical works outlined in Article 13(2) of the Berne
114
The opinion was published at the very end of
Convention.
1995, just as TRIPS was about to become effective and the U.S.
was preparing to file its formal complaint with the WTO. The
opinion appeared in the Journal of the Copyright Society of the
109. See 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 48, at 9A-75 and
accompanying text.
110. Berman Hearing Statement, supra note 108.
111. Papovich Interview, supra note 91.
112. Id.; Email from Mihály Ficsor, President, Hungarian Copyright
Council and former Assistant Director General, WIPO to Stephen Obenski
(April 11, 2002) (on file with author).
113. Email from Mihály Ficsor, supra note 112.
114. Letter from Arpad Bogsch, WIPO Director General, to Bruce Lehman,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks (Oct. 10, 1995), published in 43 J. OF THE COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.
180, 189-92 (1995) [hereinafter Bogsch Letter].
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U.S. in the form of a letter from Arpad Bogsch, the WIPO
Director General, to Bruce Lehman, the Assistant Secretary of
Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks of
115
the U.S.
Under the Berne Convention alone, countries might have
116
been able to shrug off such an opinion.
Under the TRIPS
agreement, however, any dispute would go to a WTO panel, and
there was every reason to believe that the panel would indeed
look to materials such as the Ficsor opinion as a factor in treaty
117
The possibility that Japan could actually lose
interpretation.
118
in front of a panel suddenly became very real.
An official
from the Japanese copyright office quietly admitted to USTR
119
that he believed the U.S. interpretation was probably correct.
It is not clear how much impact the opinion actually had on the
Japanese government, and, as we will later see, political
concerns probably dominated their decision to change their law.
115. Id.
116. As mentioned elsewhere in this Note, the Berne Convention
enforcement provisions had never been exercised. See supra note 77.
117. In contrast to the Berne Convention, the TRIPS agreement affords
countries recourse to the formal WTO dispute settlement procedures that have
been refined and developed through decades of precedent panel decisions
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See TRIPS, supra
note 63, art. 64(1) and see generally Dispute Settlement, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (describing history
and recent developments in the dispute settlement process). Commentators
analyzing panel decisions over the years have observed a trend towards
strengthening the rule of law in WTO dispute resolution. See generally Kim
Rubenstein and Jenny Schultz, Bringing Law And Order To International
Trade: Administrative Law Principles and the GATT/WTO, 11 ST. JOHN’S J.L.
COMM. 271 (1996) (describing panel trends and likening them to
administrative law practices). The Uruguay Round negotiations that created
the WTO and TRIPS also established an Appellate Body which functions like a
high court reviewing panel decisions. In the years since the dispute that is the
subject of this paper, the Appellate Body’s approach to interpretation of the
WTO treaties has been to emphasize formal rules of treaty interpretation,
including uncovering the common intent of the signatories. See World Trade
Organization, European Communities—Customs Classification of Some
Computer Equipment, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc.
WT/DS62/AB/R, para. 90-95 (June 5, 1998) (holding that common intentions of
signatories can never be ascertained by the subjective expectations of one
party, and one should look to outside practices to determine objective
manifestations of intent). Japan’s negotiators in 1996 could not have known
that the Appellate Body’s jurisprudence would develop in this direction, but it
can be assumed that they and all parties to the Uruguay Round negotiations
were aware that the force of panel decisions would be strengthened under the
new procedures.
118. Ficsor Contribution, supra note 41, at 3. See also Choy, supra note 43.
119. Papovich Interview, supra note 91.
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BONUS TRACK! “TOO MUCH MONKEY BUSINESS”—THE LOST
ROLE OF STATE LAW
None of the published debate or analysis of this case
mentions a particular wrinkle to the application of retroactivity
to U.S. sound recordings. Article 18(1) requires that retroactive
protection only be extended to works that “have not yet fallen
into the public domain in the country of origin through the
120
The U.S. argued that
expiry of the term of protection.”
retroactivity must be extended to its pre-1972 sound recordings
because those recordings were never protected by Federal law
in the U.S, and thus, though they are in the public domain, it is
not “through the expiry of the term of protection.” This logic
seems to have been assumed by every writer on the sound
121
But
recordings case as well as the negotiators at the time.
this reasoning fails to take into account that protection of pre1972 sound recordings is expressly left to state, not Federal
law, by the preemption exception in the U.S. Copyright Act at
122
section 301(c).
Because pre-1972 sound recordings are protected in the
U.S. by state law, the correct basis for the requirement of
retroactive protection should have been to argue not that the
recordings were never protected in the U.S., but that the
recordings were protected in the U.S. (under state law) and
that their term had not expired. Pre-1972 U.S. recordings
whose state law protection had expired would not need to be
protected in Japan. But is it true that state law protection
never expired? Have any such recordings fallen into the public
domain? The short answer seems to be that such recordings
were continuously protected, but the basis for state law
protection is sometimes unclear, coming under so-called
common law copyright, or on a misappropriation or conversion

120. Berne Convention, supra note 10, art. 18(1) (emphasis added).
Rephrased, “the starting position is that all the works in respect of which the
term or [sic] protection has not expired yet, on the day of the entry into force of
the Convention for the country concerned must be protected until the
[generally 50-year] term provided in Article 7 expires.” Bogsch Letter, supra
note 114, at 183.
121. See, e.g., Sobel, supra note 35, at 5, 6; Heath, supra note 29, 678;
Turkewitz Interview, supra note 6; Papovich Interview, supra note 91; see also
Email from Mihály Ficsor, President, Hungarian Copyright Council and
former Assistant Director General, WIPO (April 23, 2002) (on file with
author).
122. David Nimmer, Statements in Class at UCLA (Feb 4, 2002). See also
2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 48, § 8C.03.
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123

theory.
Frequently, the only state statutory protection for
sound recordings is criminal law imposing fines and jail terms
124
Under this patchwork of protection, how
for record piracy.
does one know if a work has fallen into the public domain
“through the expiry of the term of protection?”
In the most common case, where state law protection is
durationless (subject to the end of the preemption exception in
2067), the answer does not matter much from a practical
perspective. In such cases, the work was clearly protected on
the enforcement date of the TRIPS Agreement and, since it has
not fallen into the public domain, satisfies the requirements of
Article 18(1). But at least one state’s law imposes a duration: a
Colorado statute expressly limits the duration of “common law
125
Because the
copyright” of sound recordings to 56 years.
duration of protection in Colorado is greater than the TRIPS
50-year minimum, the statute has no practical effect on Japan’s
obligations, but it nonetheless illustrates that such a possibility
might have been researched. For example, if another TRIPSadhering country chooses to provide a term of greater than 56
years to foreign sound recordings and to apply the rule of the
shorter term on a work-by-work basis, one must wonder
whether a recording fixed in Colorado more than 56 years ago
is protected there or not.
It seems that no other state expressly limits the duration
126
of sound recordings protection to a certain period of years.
California Civil Code Section 980 ends state protection of sound
recordings in 2047, twenty years before the imposition of
127
Nevertheless, this statute would have
Federal preemption.
no practical effect on TRIPS obligations. However, California
law has another drafting anomaly that is interesting to explore
123. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 48, § 8C.03 nn.6-8 and
accompanying text.
124. Id. at 8C.03 n.9 and accompanying text.
125. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-4-601(1) (2001). The statute was enacted in
1963 and revised in 1971. Id. at Editor’s Note. One might presume the
inclusion of the time limitation was motivated by a desire to harmonize the
term of protection with that of Federal copyright law under the 1909
Copyright Act, which was 28 years plus a 28 year renewal term.
126. Concerted effort searching state statutes on Westlaw and Lexis did
not reveal any other state sound recording duration statutes. The current
versions of the Copyright Law Reporter (CCH) no longer carry a section
surveying state laws on sound recordings.
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 980 (a)(2) (2001). The discrepancy is the result of
the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, which added 20 years to
Federal copyright duration.
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in this context. California law appeared to have barred
transferability of rights in fixed works such as sound
128
The result might have been that once a
recordings.
performer dies, his or her right in the fixed recording would no
129
Although California almost certainly
longer be exercisable.
130
could not have intended this result, it is at least entertaining
to trace the effects on the present debate. If one accepts that
the inability to exercise a right “expires” the term of protection,
then because Japanese law implements the rule of the shorter
131
term on a rolling work-by-work basis, one could at least put
together an argument that sound recordings of works by
deceased California authors are actually not protected in Japan
today.
Such arguments are weak, though entertaining. We are
thus left with the uneasy result that U.S. sound recordings
must be protected in Japan for one reason or another, but we
can’t be sure why. In any case, after Japan agreed to change its
law, all this monkeying around became quite irrelevant to the
dispute at hand.
“HUNK O’ BERNE-ING LOVE”—POLITICAL CONCERNS TRUMP
LEGAL CONSISTENCY
The only issue left to explore is what finally led Japan to
make a concrete commitment to amend its law. The answer is
probably that an Elvis look-alike happened to become Prime
132
Ryutaro Hashimoto,
Minister of Japan on January 11, 1996.
133
widely rumored to be a fan of Western music,
was also
128. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 48, § 8C.03 at the text
accompanying n.18-20.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Doi, supra note 21, at Jap-§3[3][a].
[W]hen the country of origin of a work is a member adhering to the
Berne Convention, to the WIPO Copyright Treaty once this treaty
goes into effect, or to the W.T.O., and the term of protection fixed for
that work in the country of origin has lapsed before the expiration of
its protection in Japan under Articles 51 to 54 of the Act, that work is
no longer protected in Japan.
Id. (emphasis added).
132. Reports around the world referred to Hashimoto’s style and looks as
reminiscent of Elvis Presley. See, e.g., Gwen Robinson, ‘Elvis’ looks enhance
image of dynamic new leadership, THE TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 6, 1996, at 8;
Break the Vicious Cycle with Japan, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 106
(describing Hashimoto’s “Elvis-like sideburns”).
133. See Papovich Interview, supra note 91 (stating the rumors). It is not
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134

determined to improve trade relations with the U.S.
Japan had a long list of reasons to let the U.S. win. First,
Japan has always wanted to be a role model for developing
countries and did not want to appear soft on enforcement of
135
Such a position would
intellectual property rights.
undoubtedly backfire on Japan when it later attempted to
136
Second, Japan had
enforce its high-tech patents abroad.
already been in several related copyright disputes and was
137
Third, there was
hoping to get off the hot seat for a while.
138
solid support from Japan’s major music companies,
who
presumably believed they would sell more RIAJ-licensed copies
139
if the cheap compilations were banned.
Between the February 9, 1996 announcement of filing the
dispute with the WTO and a February 23, 1996 “mini-summit”
held between Hashimoto and President Clinton in Santa
Monica, California, reports began to leak out that Japan was
140
Then, at a press
making preparations to change its law.
conference following the mini-summit, Hashimoto was asked
about the sound recordings dispute. He told Japanese and
American reporters:
Various arguments will be made if the matter is discussed from legal
viewpoints. Other developed countries decided on the 50-year period
after Japan set up its rule. I think Japan may follow in their
footsteps. I do not mean that Japan will follow their logic. . . . But at
the same time, it should follow other developed countries’ moves to
respect the Beatles, Presley and other splendid musicians from the
141
fifties and sixties.

clear whether the rumors Hashimoto was an Elvis fan were grounded in
anything other than that his sideburns and appearance had been likened to
Elvis Presley.
134. See Clinton Heaps Praise on Japanese Trade Efforts, Agence France
Presse, Feb. 24, 1996, LEXIS, News library, News Group File All (quoting
President Clinton as calling Hashimoto instrumental in improving trade
relations during his tenure as trade minister).
135. See Heath, supra note 29, at 679.
136. Choy, supra note 43.
137. See Heath, supra note 29, at 679.
138. See Choy, supra note 43.
139. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text (detailing the structure
of the Japanese market).
140. Naoko Ichiyama, an official at the copyright division of Monbusho
(Agency for Cultural Affairs), was apparently quoted on or before Feb 15,
1996, in the Wall Street Journal as saying that legislation would be submitted
in the fall of that year. Anne Phelan, Japan Faces TRIPS Test, E. ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REPS., Feb. 15, 1996, at 5.
141. Translation of Hashimoto Press Conference, in Hashimoto Gives Press
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This announcement took USTR by surprise, and was
perhaps the first time that MITI officials had even heard
142
The next day, Japan’s
Hashimoto’s view on the matter.
Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs said that legislation
143
The
to increase protection to 50 years would be introduced.
pace of implementation was somewhat slow, consultations were
144
The legislation was finally enacted on
supposedly ongoing.
145
December 18, 1996, and the U.S. notified the WTO of the
146
mutually agreed solution on January 24, 1997.
With the dispute settled concordantly, the conflict of
interpretation rapidly disappeared from public controversy.
Japan’s amended law now provided protection to U.S. sound
recordings retroactively for 50 years, back to 1947. The final
result is that pre-1972 U.S. sound recordings receive varying
and somewhat uncertain protection under state law in the U.S.,
but clear 50-year protection in Japan. No public controversy
appears to have arisen over the possible inequity of this result,
but this should come as no surprise. In an age where countries
seem to be burning with desire to protect their information
industries, no one wants to be on the wrong side of the debate.

Conference After Clinton Talks, (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
February 26, 1996) (Original source: NHK TV, Tokyo, in Japanese), available
at LEXIS, News library, News Group File All.
142. See Papovich Interview, supra note 91.
143. See EC takes Japan to the WTO, BUSINESS LAW EUROPE (Informa
Pub. Group), May 31, 1996, LEXIS, News library, News Group File All.
144. The EC filed its own dispute months later as a means of keeping some
pressure on Japan. See World Trade Organization, Japan—Measures
Concerning Sound Recordings, Request for Consultations by the European
Communities, WTO Doc. WT/DS42/1 (June 4, 1996).
145. See Holland, supra note 3.
146. See World Trade Organization, Japan—Measures Concerning Sound
Recordings, Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, WTO Doc. WT/DS28/41
(Jan. 24, 1997); Japan, US resolve Music Copyright Dispute, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE (Kyodo News Service), Jan. 25, 1997. The EC finally notified the
WTO of a mutually agreed solution on November 7, 1997. See World Trade
Organization, Japan—Measures Concerning Sound Recordings, Notification of
a Mutually-Agreed Solution, WTO Doc. WT/DS42/4 (Nov. 17, 1997).

